John Stockwell Regie in Serien
John Stockwell, geboren als John Stockwell Samuels IV, ist ein US-amerikanischer Filmregisseur, Drehbuchautor, Schauspieler und früheres Fotomodel. John Stockwell (* März in Galveston, Texas), geboren als John Stockwell Samuels IV, ist ein US-amerikanischer Filmregisseur, Drehbuchautor. John Stockwell. Schauspieler • Producer • Regisseur • Drehbuchautor. Liebe, Freundschaft, Selbstfindung, Klassenkonflikte, gefühlsreiche Partnerschaften und. John Stockwell - Alle Bilder, Filme, TV Serien und Fakten finden Sie hier zum Star auf TV Spielfilm. Jetzt hier informieren! Serien und Filme mit John Stockwell: The L Word · Hart aber herzlich · Erben des Fluchs · Trying Times · Beverly Hills Boys Club · Fackeln im Sturm · The .
John Stockwell - Alle Bilder, Filme, TV Serien und Fakten finden Sie hier zum Star auf TV Spielfilm. Jetzt hier informieren! Serien und Filme mit John Stockwell: The L Word · Hart aber herzlich · Erben des Fluchs · Trying Times · Beverly Hills Boys Club · Fackeln im Sturm · The . Entdecke alle Serien und Filme von John Stockwell. Von den Anfängen seiner Karriere bis zu geplanten Projekten.
In doing this, we'll talk about the Korean war, the Vietnam war, and the Central American war. Everything I'm going to talk to you about is represented, one way or another, already in the public records.
You can dig it all out for yourselves, without coming to hear me if you so chose. Books, based on information gotten out of the CIA under the freedom of information act, testimony before the Congress, hearings before the Senate Church committee, research by scholars, witness of people throughout the world who have been to these target areas that we'll be talking about.
I want to emphasize that my own background is profoundly conservative. We come from South Texas, East Texas I was conditioned by my training, my marine corps training, and my background, to believe in everything they were saying about the cold war, and I took the job with great enthusiasm in the CIA to join the best and the brightest of the CIA, of our foreign service, to go out into the world, to join the struggle, to project American values and save the world for our brand of democracy.
And I believed this. I went out and worked hard What I really got out of these 6 years in Africa was a sense We didn't have many national security interests in Bujumbura, Burundi, in the heart of Africa.
I concluded that I just couldn't see the point. We were doing things it seemed because we were there, because it was our function, we were bribing people, corrupting people, and not protecting the U.
I had a chance to go drinking with this Larry Devlin, a famous CIA case officer who had overthrown Patrice Lumumba, and had him killed in , back in the Congo.
He was moving into the Africa division Chief. I talked to him in Addis Ababa at length one night, and he was giving me an explanation - I was telling him frankly, 'sir, you know, this stuff doesn't make any sense, we're not saving anybody from anything, and we are corrupting people, and everybody knows we're doing it, and that makes the U.
And he said I was getting too big for my britches. He said, you're trying to think like the people in the NSC back in Washington who have the big picture, who know what's going on in the world, who have all the secret information, and the experience to digest it.
If they decide we should have someone in Bujumbura, Burundi, and that person should be you, then you should do your job, and wait until you have more experience, and you work your way up to that point, then you will understand national security, and you can make the big decisions.
Now, get to work, and stop, you know, this philosophizing. It's a very powerful argument, our presidents use it on us.
I went back to Washington, however, and I found that others shared my concern. A formal study was done in the State Department and published internally, highly classified, called the Macomber [sp?
We didn't need to have bribery and corruption as a tool for doing business in Africa at that time. I went from And there, my career, and my life, began to get a little bit more serious.
They assigned me a country. It was during the cease-fire, '73 to ' There was no cease-fire. Young men were being slaughtered.
I saw a slaughter. Their bodies brought in and laid out in a lot next to my compound. I was up-country in Tay-ninh.
They were laid out next door, until the families could come and claim them and take them away for burial. I thought about this. I had to work with the sadistic police chief.
The post was too important to close down. They weren't going to get the man transferred or fired because that would make problems, political problems, and he was very good at working with us in the operations he worked on.
Therefore if I didn't have the stomach for the job, that they could transfer me. So I kept the job, I closed the safe-house down, I told my staff that I didn't approve of that kind of activity, and I proceeded to work with him for the next 2 years, pretending that I had reformed him, and he didn't do this sort of thing anymore.
The parallel is obvious with El Salvador today, where the CIA, the state department, works with the death squads. They don't meet the death squads on the streets where they're actually chopping up people or laying them down on the street and running trucks over their heads.
The CIA people in San Salvador meet the police chiefs, and the people who run the death squads, and they do liaise with them, they meet them beside the swimming pool of the villas.
And it's a sophisticated, civilized kind of relationship. And they talk about their children, who are going to school at UCLA or Harvard and other schools, and they don't talk about the horrors of what's being done.
They pretend like it isn't true. What I ran into in addition to that was a corruption in the CIA and the intelligence business that made me question very seriously what it was all about, including what I was doing Now, the corruption was so bad, that the S.
Vietnamese army was a skeleton army. Colonels would let the troops go home if they would come in once a month and sign the pay vouchers so the colonel could pocket the money.
Then he could sell half of the uniforms and boots and M's to the communist forces - that was their major supply, just as it is in El Salvador today.
He could use half of the trucks to haul produce, half of the helicopters to haul heroin. And the Army couldn't fight. And we lived with it, and we saw it, and there was no doubt - everybody talked about it openly.
We could provide all kinds of proof, and they wouldn't let us report it. Now this was a serious problem because the south was attacked in the winter of , and it collapsed like a big vase hit by a sledgehammer.
And the U. I had been designated as the task-force commander that would run this secret war [in Angola in and ] And I couldn't resist the opportunity to know.
I knew the CIA was not a worthwhile organization, I had learned that the hard way. But the question was where did the U. I wanted to know if wise men were making difficult decisions based on truly important, threatening information, threatening to our national security interests.
If that had been the case, I still planned to get out of the CIA, but I would know that the system, the invisible government, our national security complex, was in fact justified and worth while.
And so I took the job Suffice it to say I wouldn't be standing in front of you tonight if I had found these wise men making these tough decisions.
What I found, quite frankly, was fat old men sleeping through sub-committee meetings of the NSC in which we were making decisions that were killing people in Africa.
I mean literally. Senior ambassador Ed Mulcahy You can change the names in my book [about Angola] and you've got Nicaragua The point is that the U.
We said it was the Soviets and the Cubans that were doing it. It was the U. There would have been no war if we hadn't gone in first.
We put arms in, they put arms in. We put advisors in, they answered with advisors. We put in Zairian para-commando battalions, they put in Cuban army troops.
We brought in the S. African army, they brought in the Cuban army. And they pushed us away. They blew us away because we were lying, we were covering ourselves with lies, and they were telling the truth.
And it was not a war that we could fight. We didn't have interests there that should have been defended that way. The assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Nathaniel Davis, no bleeding-heart liberal he was known by some people in the business as the butcher of Santiago , he said we should stay out of the conflict and work with whoever eventually won, and that was obviously the MPLA.
We brushed these people aside, forced Nat Davis to resign, and proceeded with our war. The MPLA said they wanted to be our friends, they didn't want to be pushed into the arms of the Soviet Union; they begged us not to fight them, they wanted to work with us.
We said they wanted a cheap victory, they wanted a walk-over, they wanted to be un-opposed, that we wouldn't give them a cheap victory, we would make them earn it, so to speak.
And we did. Now, the most significant thing that I got out of all of this, in addition to the fact that our rationales were basically false, was that we lied.
To just about everybody involved. One third of my staff in this task force that I put together in Washington, commanding this global operation, pulling strings all over the world to focus pressure onto Angola, and military activities into Angola, one third of my staff was propagandists, who were working, in every way they could think of, to get stories into the U.
Our ambassador to the United Nations, Patrick Moynihan, he read continuous statements of our position to the Security Council, the general assembly, and the press conferences, saying the Russians and Cubans were responsible for the conflict, and that we were staying out, and that we deplored the militarization of the conflict.
And every statement he made was false. And every statement he made was originated in the sub-committee of the NSC that I sat on as we managed this thing.
The state department press person read these position papers daily to the press. We would write papers for him.
Four paragraphs. And all four paragraphs would be false. Nothing to do with the truth. Designed to play on events, to create this impression of Soviet and Cuban aggression in Angola.
When they were in fact responding to our initiatives. And the CIA director was required by law to brief the Congress.
This CIA director Bill Colby - the same one that dumped our people in Vietnam - he gave 36 briefings of the Congress, the oversight committees, about what we were doing in Angola.
And he lied. At 36 formal briefings. And such lies are perjury, and it's a felony to lie to the Congress. He lied about our relationship with South Africa.
We were working closely with the South African army, giving them our arms, coordinating battles with them, giving them fuel for their tanks and armored cars.
He said we were staying well away from them. They were concerned about these white mercenaries that were appearing in Angola, a very sensitive issue, hiring whites to go into a black African country, to help you impose your will on that black African country by killing the blacks, a very sensitive issue.
The Congress was concerned we might be involved in that, and he assured them we had nothing to do with it. We had in fact formed four little mercenary armies and delivered them into Angola to do this dirty business for the CIA.
And he lied to them about that. They asked if we were putting arms into the conflict, and he said no, and we were. We had 24 people sleeping inside the country, training in the use of weapons, installing communications systems, planning battles, and he said, we didn't have anybody inside the country.
In summary about Angola, without U. The outcome might have been peaceful, or at least much less bloody.
The MPLA was winning when we went in, and they went ahead and won, which was, according to our consul, the best thing for the country.
At the end of this thing the Cubans were entrenched in Angola, seen in the eyes of much of the world as being the heroes that saved these people from the CIA and S.
African forces. We had allied the U. African army, and that's illegal, and it's impolitic. We had hired white mercenaries and eventually been identified with them.
And that's illegal, and it's impolitic. And our lies had been visible lies. We were caught out on those lies.
And the world saw the U. After it was over, you have to ask yourself, was it justified? What did the MPLA do after they had won? Were they lying when they said they wanted to be our friends?
You can't trust a communist, can you? They proceeded to buy five jets from Boeing Aircraft in Seattle. And they brought in 52 U. They didn't buy [the Soviet Union's] Aeroflot David Rockefeller himself tours S.
Africa and comes back and holds press conferences, in which he says that we have no problem doing business with the so-called radical states of Southern Africa.
I wrote my book. I was fortunate - I got it out. It was a best-seller. A lot of people read it. I was able to take my story to the American people.
Got on 60 minutes, and lots and lots of other shows. I testified to the Congress and then I began my education in earnest, after having been taught to fight communists all my life.
I went to see what communists were all about. I went to Cuba to see if they do in fact eat babies for breakfast. And I found they don't.
I went to Budapest, a country that even national geographic admits is working nicely. I went to Jamaica to talk to Michael Manley about his theories of social democracy.
I went to Grenada and established a dialogue with Maurice Bishop and Bernard Coard and Phyllis Coard, to see - these were all educated people, and experienced people - and they had a theory, they had something they wanted to do, they had rationales and explanations - and I went repeatedly to hear them.
And then of course I saw the U. I read as many books as I could find on the subject - book after book after book.
I've got several hundred books on the shelf over my desk on the subject of U. In television you get capsules of news that someone else puts together what they want you to hear about the news.
In newspapers you get what the editors select to put in the newspaper. If you want to know about the world and understand, to educate yourself, you have to get out and dig, dig up books and articles for yourself.
Read, and find out for yourselves. As you'll see, the issues are very, very important. I also was able to meet the players, the people who write, the people who have done studies, people who are leading different situations.
I went to Nicaragua a total of 7 times. This was a major covert action. It lasted longer and evolved to be bigger than what we did in Angola.
It gave me a chance, after running something from Washington, to go to a country that was under attack, to talk to the leadership, to talk to the people, to look and see what happens when you give white phosporous or grenades or bombs or bullets to people, and they go inside a country, to go and talk to the people, who have been shot, or hit, or blown up We're talking about 10 to 20 thousand covert actions [the CIA has performed since ].
What I found was that lots and lots of people have been killed in these things Some of them are very, very bloody.
The Indonesian covert action of , reported by Ralph McGehee, who was in that area division, and had documents on his desk, in his custody about that operation.
He said that one of the documents concluded that this was a model operation that should be copied elsewhere in the world. Not only did it eliminate the effective communist party Indonesian communist party , it also eliminated the entire segment of the population that tended to support the communist party - the ethnic Chinese, Indonesian Chinese.
And the CIA's report put the number of dead at , killed. And that was one covert action. We're talking about 1 to 3 million people killed in these things.
Two of these things have led us directly into bloody wars. There was a covert action against China, destabilizing China, for many, many years, with a propaganda campaign to work up a mood, a feeling in this country, of the evils of communist China, and attacking them, as we're doing in Nicaragua today, with an army that was being launched against them to parachute in and boat in and destabilize the country.
And this led us directly into the Korean war. Panicking people in Vietnam to create migrations to the south so they could photograph it and show how people were fleeing communism.
And on and on, until they got us into the Vietnam war, and 2,, people were killed. There is a mood, a sentiment in Washington, by our leadership today, for the past 4 years, that a good communist is a dead communist.
If you're killing 1 to 3 million communists, that's great. President Reagan has gone public and said he would reduce the Soviet Union to a pile of ashes.
The problem, though, is that these people killed by our national security activities are not communists. They're not Russians, they're not KGB.
In the field we used to play chess with the KGB officers, and have drinks with them. It was like professional football players - we would knock heads on Sunday, maybe in an operation, and then Tuesday you're at a banquet together drinking toasts and talking.
The people that are dying in these things are people of the third world. That's the common denominator that you come up with. People of the third world.
People that have the misfortune of being born in the Mitumba mountains of the Congo, in the jungles of Southeast Asia, and now in the hills of northern Nicaragua.
Far more Catholics than communists, far more Buddhists than communists. Most of them couldn't give you an intelligent definition of communism, or of capitalism.
Central America has been a traditional target of U. If you want to get an easy-read of the history of our involvement in Central America, read Walter LaFeber's book, "Inevitable Revolutions".
We have dominated the area since We've had a policy of dominion, of excluding other countries, other industrial powers from Europe, from competing with us in the area.
Just to give you an example of how complete this is, and how military this has been, between and W. II, we had 5, marines in Nicaragua for a total of 28 years.
We invaded the Dominican Republic 4 times. Haiti, we occupied it for 12 years. We put our troops into Cuba 4 times, Panama 6 times, Guatemala once, plus a CIA covert action to overthrow the democratic government there once.
Honduras, 7 times. And by the way, we put 12, troops into the Soviet Union during that same period of time. The next three leaders of Guatemala [after the CIA installed the puppet, Colonel Armas in a coup] died violent deaths, and amnesty international tells us that the governments we've supported in power there since then, have killed 80, people.
You can read about that one in the book "Bitter Fruit", by Kinzer and Schlesinger. Kinzer's a New York Times Journalist However, the money, the millions and millions of dollars we put into this program [helping Central America] inevitably went to the rich, and not to the people of the countries involved.
And while we were doing this, while we were trying, at least saying we were trying, to correct the problems of Central and Latin America, the CIA was doing its thing, too.
Interrogation, including torture, the way the CIA taught it. Dan Mitrione, the famous exponent of these things, did 7 years in Brazil and 3 in Uruguay, teaching interrogation, teaching torture.
He was supposed to be the master of the business, how to apply the right amount of pain, at just the right times, in order to get the response you want from the individual.
They developed a wire. AID' written on the side, so the people even knew where these things came from. They developed a wire that was strong enough to carry the current and fine enough to fit between the teeth, so you could put one wire between the teeth and the other one in or around the genitals and you could crank and submit the individual to the greatest amount of pain, supposedly, that the human body can register.
Now how do you teach torture? You'll have to lay on your hands and try it yourselves. All they [the guinea pigs, beggars from off the streets] could do was lie there and scream.
And when they would collapse, they would bring in doctors and shoot them up with vitamin B and rest them up for the next class.
And when they would die, they would mutilate the bodies and throw them out on the streets, to terrify the population so they would be afraid of the police and the government.
And this is what the CIA was teaching them to do. And one of the women who was in this program for 2 years - tortured in Brazil for 2 years - she testified internationally when she eventually got out.
They were very ordinary people There's a lesson in all of this. And the lesson is that it isn't only Gestapo maniacs, or KGB maniacs, that do inhuman things to other people, it's people that do inhuman things to other people.
And we are responsible for doing these things, on a massive basis, to people of the world today. And we do it in a way that gives us this plausible denial to our own consciences; we create a CIA, a secret police, we give them a vast budget, and we let "them" go and run these programs in our name, and we pretend like we don't know it's going on, although the information is there for us to know; and we pretend like it's ok because we're fighting some vague communist threat.
And we're just as responsible for these 1 to 3 million people we've slaughtered and for all the people we've tortured and made miserable, as the Gestapo was the people that they've slaughtered and killed.
Genocide is genocide! Now we're pouring money into El Salvador. A billion dollars or so. And it's a documented fact that the Mort Halperin, testifying to a committee of the Congress, he suggested we could simplify the whole thing politically just by investing our money directly in the Miami banks in their names and just stay out of El Salvador altogether.
And the people would be better off. What's happening in Nicaragua today is covert action. It's a classic de-stabilization program.
In November 16, , President Reagan allocated 19 million dollars to form an army, a force of contras, they're called, ex-Somoza national guards, the monsters who were doing the torture and terror in Nicaragua that made the Nicaraguan people rise up and throw out the dictator, and throw out the guard.
We went back to create an army of these people. We are killing, and killing, and terrorizing people. Not only in Nicaragua but the Congress has leaked to the press - reported in the New York Times, that there are 50 covert actions going around the world today, CIA covert actions going on around the world today.
You have to be asking yourself, why are we destabilizing 50 corners of the troubled world? Why are we about to go to war in Nicaragua, the Central American war?
It is the function, I suggest, of the CIA, with its 50 de-stabilization programs going around the world today, to keep the world unstable, and to propagandize the American people to hate, so we will let the establishment spend any amount of money on arms The Victor Marchetti ruling of the Supreme Court gave the government the right to prepublication censorship of books.
They challenged items in his page book. He fought it in court, and eventually they deleted some 60 odd items in his book.
The Frank Snepp ruling of the Supreme Court gave the government the right to sue a government employee for damages. Now, what does this mean?
In a debate in Congress - this is very controversial - the supporters of this bill made it clear It would not be a felony what they had done because that's national security and none of them were ever punished for those activities.
Efforts to muzzle government employees. President Reagan has been banging away at this one ever since.
Proposing that every government employee, for the rest of his or her life, would have to submit anything they wrote to 6 committees of the government for censorship, for the rest of their lives.
To keep the scandals from leaking out Then it starts getting heavy. President Reagan, working through the Secretary of State Shultz But this bill It provides that the secretary of state would put together a list of people that he considers to be terrorist, or terrorist supporters, or terrorist sympathizers.
And if your name, or your organization, is put on this list, they could kick down your door and haul you away, or kill you, without any due process of the law and search warrants and trial by jury, and all of that, with impunity.
Now, there was a tremendous outcry on the part of jurists. And they did so by the thousands. And President Reagan and Secretary Shultz have persisted And yes, innocent people will have to be killed in the process.
But, we must have this law because of the threat of international terrorism'. Think a minute. These things catch a lot of attention.
But how many Americans died in terrorist actions last year? According to Secretary Shultz, Now, obviously that's terrible but we killed 55, people on our highways with drunken driving; we kill 2, people in far nastier, bloodier, mutilating, gang-raping ways in Nicaragua last year alone ourselves.
Obviously 79 peoples' death is not enough reason to take away the protection of American citizens, of due process of the law.
But they're pressing for this. The special actions teams that will do the pre-emptive striking have already been created, and trained in the defense department.
They're building detention centers. There were 8 kept as mothballs under the McCarran act after World War II, to detain aliens and dissidents in the next war, as was done in the next war, as was done with the Japanese people during World War II.
They're building 10 more, and army camps, and the He's going about the country lobbying and demanding that he be given authority, in the times of national emergency, to declare martial law, and establish a curfew, and gun down people who violate the curfew And then there's Ed Meese, as I said.
The highest law enforcement officer in the land, President Reagan's closest friend, going around telling us that the constitution never did guarantee freedom of speech and press, and due process of the law, and assembly.
What they are planning for this society, and this is why they're determined to take us into a war if we'll permit it So he's getting himself some laws so when he puts in the troops in Nicaragua, he can take charge of the American people, and put people in jail, and kick in their doors, and kill them if they don't like what he's doing I just got my latest book back from the CIA censors.
If I had not submitted it to them, I would have gone to jail, without trial - blow off juries and all that sort of thing - for having violated our censorship laws In that job [Angola] I sat on a sub-committee of the NSC, so I was like a chief of staff, with the GSs like 3-star generals Henry Kissinger, Bill Colby the CIA director , the GSs and the CIA, making important decisions and my job was to put it all together and make it happen and run it, an interesting place from which to watch a covert action being done When the world's gotten blocked up before, like a monopoly game where everything's owned and nobody can make any progress, the way they erased the board and started over has been to have big world wars, and erase countries and bomb cities and bomb banks and then start from scratch again.
This is not an option to us now because of all these 52, nuclear weapons The United States CIA is running 50 covert actions, destabilizing further almost one third of the countries in the world today By the way, everything I'm sharing with you tonight is in the public record.
The 50 covert actions - these are secret, but that has been leaked to us by members of the oversight committee of the Congress.
I urge you not to take my word for anything. I'm going to stand here and tell you and give you examples of how our leaders lie. Obviously I could be lying.
The only way you can figure it out for yourself is to educate yourselves. If you don't fill your mind eagerly with the truth, dig it out from the records, go and see for yourself, then your mind remains blank and your adrenaline pumps, and you can be mobilized and excited to do things that are not in your interest to do Nicaragua is not the biggest covert action, it is the most famous one.
In December he resigned from the Agency, citing deep concerns for the methods and results of CIA paramilitary operations in third world countries.
He claimed that the CIA was counterproductive to national security , and that its "secret wars" provided no benefit for the United States.
Stockwell was one of the first CIA agents to go public by writing a bestselling book. In , Stockwell said that "if the Soviet Union were to disappear off the face of the map, the United States would quickly seek out new enemies to justify its own military-industrial complex.
During the s Stockwell visited college campuses to speak out against CIA support for Central American death squads.
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Down this week. John Stockwell is an American actor, director, producer and writer who is probably best known - as an actor - for his roles in the Tom Cruise vehicles Losin' It and Top Gun , and the Stephen King - John Carpenter film Christine John has since moved from acting into the director's chair.
His directing credits include Blue Crush Filmography by Job Trailers and Videos. June's Most Anticipated Streaming Titles.
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Blue Crush Director. As he later explained: "everyone in Texas knew that Lyndon Johnson was corrupt to the core, with mob ties, with murders sometimes associated with his political campaigns".
His main task was to monitor communist activity in the region. He was later promoted to the position of chief of the CIA base in the Katanga province.
Stockwell reported back to Washington that he did not believe that the CIA presence in the Congo was not justified as it was not advancing "US national security interests".
Stockwell spent six years in Africa before serving in Vietnam. He remained in the country until joining the US flight from Vietnam in April, This resulted in Turner initiating a "house-cleaning of the clandestine services".
He has also made several lecture tours where he has spoken on CIA covert operations. We have not met and will not have the opportunity of working together, as you are coming into the Central Intelligence Agency when I am leaving.
Although I am disassociating myself from the Agency, I have read with considerable interest about your appointment and listened to some of your comments.
You have clearly committed yourself to defending the Agency from its detractors and to improving its image, and this has stirred a wave of hope among many of its career officers.
However, others are disappointed that you have given no indication of intention, or even awareness of the need, for the 'internal housecleaning that is so conspicuously overdue the Agency.
You invited Agency officers to write you their suggestions or grievances, and you promised personally to read all such letters.
While I no longer have a career interest, having already submitted my resignation, numerous friends in the DDO Deputy Directorate for Operations have encouraged me to write to you, hoping that it might lead to measures which would upgrade the clandestine services from its present mediocre standards to the elite organization it was once reputed to be.
While I sympathize with their complaints, I have agreed to write this letter more to document the circumstances and conditions which led to my own disillusionment with CIA.
First, let me introduce myself. My file documents what I was told occasionally, that I could realistically aspire to top managerial positions in the Agency.
My disillusionment was progressive throughout four periods of my career. First, during three successive assignments in Africa from through I increasingly questioned the value and justification of the reporting and operations we worked so hard to generate.
In one post, Abidjan, there was no Eastern bloc or Communist presence, no subversion, limited United States interests and a stable government.
The three of us competed with State Department officers to report on President Houphouet-Boigny's health and local politics.
I attempted, to rationalize that my responsibility was to contribute, and not to evaluate the importance of my contribution which should be done by supergrades in Washington.
However, this was increasingly difficult as I looked up through a chain of command which included, step-by-step: a the Branch Chief, who had never served in Africa and was conspicuously ignorant of Black Africa,; b the Chief of Operations, who was a senior officer although he had never served an operational overseas tour and was correspondingly naive about field operations; and c the Division Chief, who was a political dilettante who had never served an operational tour in Africa Their leadership continuously reflected their inexperience and ignorance.
Standards of operations were low in the field, considerable energy was devoted to the accumulation of perquisites and living a luxurious life at the taxpayer's expense.
This was quite within the regulations. The organization currently belongs to the old, to the burned out.
Young officers, and there are some very good ones, must wait until generations retire before they can move up. These young officers are generally supervised by unpromotable middle-grade officers, who for many years have been unable to go overseas and participate personally in operational activity.
These conditions are obviously discouraging to dynamic young people, demoralizingly so, and several have told me they are also seeking opportunities outside the Agency.
With each new Director they hope there will be a housecleaning and reform, but each Director comes and goes, seven in my time, preoccupied with broader matters of state, uttering meaningless and inaccurate platitudes about conditions and standards inside the DDO.
The only exception was James Schlesinger, who initiated a housecleaning but was transferred to the Department of Defence before it had much effect.
You, sir, have been so bold as to state your intention to abrogate American constitutional rights, those of freedom of speech, in order to defend and protect the American intelligence establishment.
This strikes me as presumptuous of you, especially before you have even had a good look inside the CIA to see if it is worth sacrificing constitutional rights for.
If you get the criminal penalties you are seeking for the disclosure of classified information, or even the civil penalties which President Carter and Vice-President Mondale have said they favour, then Americans who work for the CIA could not, when they find themselves embroiled in criminal and immoral activity which is commonplace in the Agency, expose that activity without risking jail or poverty as punishment for speaking out.
Cynical men, such as those who gravitate to the top of the CIA, could then by classifying a document or two protect and cover up illegal actions with relative impunity.
I predict that the American people will never surrender to you the right of any individual to stand in public and say whatever is in his heart and mind.
That right is our last line of defence against the tyrannies and invasions of privacy which events of recent years have demonstrated are more than paranoiac fantasies.
I am enthusiastic about the nation's prospects under the new administration, and I am certain President Carter will reconsider his position on this issue.
And you, sir, may well decide to address yourself to the more appropriate task of setting the Agency straight from the inside out.
The President was perfunctorily warned of the threats against him, but the usual vigilant efforts to protect him were not taken.
They do it continuously not only inside the United States but in foreign capitals around the world.
Numerous, almost routine, techniques are involved, like bringing extra security forces to blanket problem areas, moving in caravans of cars at a brisk 45 miles an hour, and using, whenever possible, unannounced routes that do not include sharp, slow turns.
When President Kennedy and his wife visited Dallas on November 22, , nearly all of the protections were lifted.
Available Texas Guard units were not called into the city and available Dallas policemen were temporarily released from duty.
The result? A team of CIA, Cuban exile, and Mafia-related renegades organized a simple military ambush in Dallas and successfully gunned him down.
The ambush and its coverup were brazen and astonishingly open. In fact several plots, in Chicago, Miami, and Houston, to kill Kennedy had misfired or been thwarted.
The plot that succeeded in Dealey Plaza was so open that various people were reported prior to the event to have said that Kennedy would be killed with a rifle and a patsy would be blamed for the crime.
Obviously, most CIA personnel were not involved and did not know of the plot since sensitive operations are compartmentalized in order to protect their security.
Moreover, the great majority of the coat-and-tie people inside CIA headquarters would never have put up with a hit on the President.
A great deal of the success of the CIA is due to its ability to attract patriotic, good soldiers who believe in the general rightness of what they do, and then insulate them through compartmentalization from the heavier activities.
The team set up a military-style ambush in Dealey Plaza, with shooters on the tops of buildings and the famous grassy knoll.